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POOLING AND REDISTRIBUTION WITH MORAL HAZARD 
 








We study a model in which risk-averse consumers obtain mutual insurance by 
participating voluntarily in pools. More precisely, consumers commit to contributing a 
fraction of their future uncertain endowment to a common pool. In exchange, they gain 
the right to receive a share of the total return of the pool, in proportion to their 
promises. Consumers influence the likelihood of the good  state of nature by 
undertaking a hidden action. We therefore provide a model of mutual insurance with 
moral hazard. We  first analyze the equilibrium properties of the model and then 
illustrate how an aggregate pool of heterogenous consumers Pareto dominates the two 
segregated pools. 
Keywords: moral hazard, pool of promises, heterogeneous consumers. 
JEL Classiffication: D5, H23, O16. 
 1 Introduction
In this paper we study a model in which risk-averse consumers obtain mutual in-
surance by participating voluntarily in pools. More precisely, consumers commit to
contributing a fraction of their future uncertain endowment to a common pool. In
exchange, they gain the right to receive a share of the total return of the pool, in
proportion to their promise. Consumers in°uence the likelihood of the good state
of nature by undertaking a hidden action. We therefore provide a model of mutual
insurance with moral hazard.
In our view, it is helpful to distinguish mutual insurance organizations according
to the way in which their members interact. A typical form of mutual insurance
is the one in which members interact strategically. Historically, these organizations
emerged to cater to the particular needs of speci¯c populations limited in their access
to the credit, insurance and goods markets. Economic literature has been trying to
understand these organizations by focusing on both their endogenous formation
and the mechanisms adopted to overcome the problems arising from information
asymmetries (among the most recent contributions are those of Bloch et al. (2005),
Cabrales et al. (2003), De Weerdt and Dercon (2006)). Case studies of mutual
insurance reveal that it relies heavily on monitoring and enforcement mechanisms
that sometimes constrain the capability of the organization to provide full insurance.
A di®erent type of mutual insurance organization arises when members do not
interact strategically and the price of insurance is taken as given. This happens when
such organizations have many members. Possible examples of big insurance pools
are national insurance systems (health, disability, and pension). Historically, these
were ¯rst created as mutual insurance funds mainly associated with occupations, but
they have gradually turned into broad national systems. This trend has also been
associated, at least in Europe, with an increase in redistribution in such systems
(Pestieau (2006)). Naturally, a consumer takes the price of social insurance as
given.3
Like Dubey and Geanakoplos (2002), in the present paper we study a model of
insurance pools with many participants, although our aim is substantially di®erent
2from theirs. In fact, their main goal is to overcome the problem of the existence of
equilibrium in the competitive model with adverse selection, ¯rst studied by Roth-
schild and Stiglitz (1976). We, on the other hand, study big insurance pools with
moral hazard, focusing on the possibilities of redistribution that emerge among het-
erogenous groups of consumers.4 In particular, we wish to stress the redistribution
possibilities of insurance pools, even in the presence of moral hazard.
Several di®erences emerge in adapting the framework of Dubey and Geanakoplos
(2002) to a model encompassing ex-ante moral hazard. The most signi¯cant is that
the proportion of high risk consumers becomes endogenous, since it depends on the
action undertaken, which is consumers' optimal choice.5 Since consumers take the
total return of the pool as given and are unrestricted in the amount of insurance they
can obtain, the structure that we have in mind may appear not to be compatible with
the incentives consumers need to undertake high e®ort. At equilibrium consumers
may end up choosing high insurance coverage and low e®ort. This is, indeed, one
possible equilibrium con¯guration, but it is not the only one. In particular, there
exists an equilibrium in which some consumers choose high e®ort, and others low
e®ort.6
After studying the case of a homogeneous group of consumers, we consider the
case of heterogeneous groups and show how, in an economy of poor and rich con-
sumers, an aggregate pool of promises may represent a Pareto improvement on
segregated pools of promises. As will become clear, the rich can, at no cost, redis-
tribute towards the poor because they are wealthier and more able to prevent bad
outcomes.
Our paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and Section
3 characterizes its equilibrium. Two examples of the mixed pool equilibrium are
provided in Section 4. Section 5 analyzes the possibility of a pool of comitments by
both rich and poor and concludes that such a heterogenous pool Pareto dominates
the two segregated pools. Section 6 concludes. All proofs are relegated to the
Appendix.
32 The model
We consider a pure exchange economy with a single consumption good. The economy
is populated by a large number of (ex-ante) identical consumers, and lasts for two
periods t = 0;1. Today, at t = 0; there is no consumption, and consumers face
an idiosyncratic uncertainty regarding their endowments at t = 1: Tomorrow each
consumer may be in either of two states of nature s 2 S = fG;Bg, where G stands
for good and B for bad. Individual endowments are denoted by the vector w =
(wG;wB) 2 R2
+ , with wG > wB > 0. It is assumed that at t = 1 endowments
are veri¯able, so that it is possible to determine the idiosyncratic state in which
consumers ¯nd themselves.
Consumers may in°uence the likelihood of the states of nature by undertaking
an action a 2 A = fL;Hg, corresponding to low e®ort and high e®ort, respectively.
In what follows, ¼a denotes the probability of the good state when action a is chosen,
with 1 > ¼H > ¼L > 0. The (dis-)utility of the action is ca , and cH > cL = 0. The
tradeo® is thus clear: on the one hand undertaking action H increases the likelihood
of the good state of nature, but on the other hand it is costly since it requires e®ort.
It is assumed that the action chosen by a consumer is not veri¯able, so information
is asymmetric.
Preferences are represented by an expected utility function U(x;a) : R2
+£A ! R
that depends on state contingent consumption bundle x = (xG;xB) 2 R2
+ , and
action as follows:
U(x;a) := ¼au(xG) + (1 ¡ ¼a)u(xB) ¡ ca ;
where the (Bernoulli) utility function u is twice di®erentiable, strictly increasing,
and strictly concave.
Since the action set is binary, preferences represented by U are inherently non-
convex, as shown in Figure 1, which illustrates preferences for state contingent con-
sumption bundles. The high action indi®erence curve is steeper than the low action
one, and thus when the two indi®erence curves cross they make a kink. Low and high
e®ort action indi®erence curves cross at the switching locus, a set of consumption
4bundles de¯ned as follows:
fx 2 R2
+ j U(x;H) = U(x;L)g:
Therefore, the switching locus is the set of consumption bundles that makes con-
sumers indi®erent between choosing the low and high actions. Above it, closer to
the certainty line, consumers choose the low e®ort action. Below it, consumers pre-
fer to choose the high e®ort action.7 The intuition is the following: If contingent
endowments are very di®erent, a consumer would rather strongly try to avoid the
bad state of nature by undertaking the high e®ort action. If, by contrast, contingent
endowments are not that di®erent, it is not worth making the e®ort to avoid the





Figure 1: Indi®erence curves and switching locus.
We assume that each consumer faces uncertainty independently of other con-
sumers. This assumption, added to the fact that there is a large number of con-
sumers, rules out aggregated uncertainty, hence the aggregate (average) endowment
is independent of states of nature. We denote the aggregate (average) endowment
when action a is chosen by:
¹ wa = ¼awG + (1 ¡ ¼a)wB:
5If all consumers undertake action H, aggregate endowment is
¹ wH = ¼HwG + (1 ¡ ¼H)wB:
If however they all take action L, aggregate endowment is
¹ wL = ¼LwG + (1 ¡ ¼L)wB:
Finally, if a fraction q 2 [0;1] of consumers undertake action H, aggregate endow-
ment is
¹ wq = q ¹ wH + (1 ¡ q) ¹ wL: (1)
2.1 The pool of promises
Since consumers are risk-averse, they would like to smooth their consumption across
idiosyncratic states. We assume consumers may voluntarily constitute a pool of
promises so as to e®ectively insure themselves. The pool works as follows: Today,
each consumer makes the voluntary promise to deliver to the pool a fraction of
tomorrow's endowment . In exchange, tomorrow, each consumer is entitled to receive
a share of the total deliveries to the pool proportional to the promise made. We will
call the latter the return of the pool.
Tomorrow, once the state of nature is realized, each consumer engages in a net
trade with the pool by transferring the di®erence between what he/she is entitled to
receive and the delivery to the pool ¡ what he/she has promised. If this di®erence
is positive (negative), so is the net trade, and his/her ¯nal income is higher (lower)
than it would have been without the pool.
Since realized endowments are veri¯able, we assume that promises are always
honored when the realized endowment is positive. If endowment is zero, then con-
sumers are allowed not to deliver. This means that consumers who do not contribute
because of lack of endowment are still entitled to receive their share of the pooled
deliveries.
It helps to think of more speci¯c scenarios. For the sake of simplicity, we consider
a pool of only two consumers whose endowment tomorrow may be either wG = 1 or
wB = 0. In Example 1 in Table 1, both consumers promise to deliver to the pool 0.5
6Example 1 Example 2
Consumer 1 Consumer 2 Consumer 1 Consumer 2
Promise 0.5 0.5 1.5 0.5
Share 1/2 1/2 3/4 1/4
Endowment 1 0 1 0
(Net) Delivery 0.5 0 0.75 0
Return 0.5(1/2) 0.5(1/2) 0:75(3=4) 0.75(1/4)
Consumption 3/4 1/4 13/16 3/16
Table 1: Examples of the pool of promises
of their endowments of tomorrow. Since they have promised the same proportion,
tomorrow they will both be entitled to receive the same share of the pool, even
though they may have made di®erent deliveries. Consumer 1, who faces the good
state of nature, delivers 0:5 to the pool, while Consumer 2 delivers zero. The pool
thus amounts to 0:5, to be equally shared. Consumer 1 ends up consuming 3=4
of his endowment (0:5 not delivered, plus the net trade with the pool, 1=4) while
Consumer 2 ends up consuming 1=4. In Example 2, however, because consumers
promise di®erently they are entitled to di®erent shares of the pool. This example also
illustrates that promises may be higher than 1, i.e., gross deliveries might be higher
than wG: Consumer 1 promises 1:5 of his tomorrow endowment and Consumer 2
0:5, they are entitled to a share of the pool of 3=4 and 1=4, respectively.
Since the pool we have in mind incorporates promises from a continuum of
consumers, these examples are merely aimed at understanding the mechanism of
promise, mainly that promises, and not deliveries, determine the share of the pool.
Moreover, in our set-up, consumers may undertake di®erent actions that in°uence
the likelihood of states of nature and thus the risk that they face. Promises made to
the pool can hence be di®erent depending on the action undertaken. Yet, contingent
on the action, consumers will all promise the same since they are ex ante equal.
Therefore, if q, respectively (1 ¡ q), consumers make the high, respectively low,
e®ort and commit accordingly µH, respectively µL, each consumer promising µa has
7the right to the following share of the pool:
µa
qµH + (1 ¡ q)µL
:
where, with consistent notation, we let µa be the promise of those consumers choosing
action a. The deliveries e®ectively made to the pool depend on the state of nature,
although aggregate endowment is certain, as discussed above. Therefore, return per
promise, de¯ned as
· =
qµH ¹ wH + (1 ¡ q)µL ¹ wL
qµH + (1 ¡ q)µL
; (2)
is itself independent of the state of nature, and by construction wB < ¹ wL 6 · 6
¹ wH < wG . In what follows, we say that the pool return per promise · is consistent
if it satis¯es (2).
2.2 Consumers' problem
Consumers take the return of the pool as given, and choose their promises and
actions so as to maximize expected utility. A promise is µ > 0, which implies that
negative insurance is ruled out and that consumers are not constrained in their
promises. In particular, as stressed above, they may commit a fraction greater than
one.
When promising µ, they give up µws in the s state of nature. Giving up µws
allows them to receive µ·, where · denotes the pool's return per promise, as given by
(2). Consumers form expectations about the pool's return per promise in the same
spirit as they do about prices in a competitive economy. Given these expectations,
they choose their optimal promise and optimal action. In equilibrium, expectations
are ful¯lled and all optimal plans are realized without resorting to strategic behavior.
We then have that a consumer's state contingent consumption is:
xG = wG ¡ µ(wG ¡ ·);
xB = wB ¡ µ(wB ¡ ·):
The above contingent budget constraints can be re-written in a way that shows
the transfer of consumption from the good state of nature to the bad one. Therefore,
8let us ¯rst eliminate µ, and rewrite the above constraints as follows:
xB = wB ¡
· ¡ wB
wG ¡ ·
(xG ¡ wG); (3)
From the above equation, it can be seen that by giving up (wG ¡ ·) units of con-
sumption in the good state a consumer gets (· ¡ wB) units of consumption in the
bad state per unit of promise, since by construction wB < · < wG . Therefore,
through pool consumers can indeed transfer consumption from the good state of
nature to the bad one, that is they can buy insurance.
Now let us eliminate ·, and rewrite the contingent budget constraints as follows
xB = xG ¡ (wG ¡ wB)(1 ¡ µ): (4)
The above equations merely state how much is left over for consumption in the bad
state of nature for a promise µ. When µ = 1, all the endowment is promised to
the pool whatever the state of nature. Consequently consumption is equalized in
the two states of nature, i.e. consumers are fully insured. More generally, from the
above equation we conclude that:
xB Q xG , µ Q 1:
Clearly, a solution must satisfy both constraints. Graphically, it corresponds
to the intersection of equations (3) and (4), as shown in Figure 2, borrowed from
Dubey and Geanakoplos (2002).
Figure 2 illustrates precisely the transfer of consumption from the good state of
nature to the bad. The horizontal axis represents consumption in the good state of
nature, and the vertical represents consumption in the bad state. In the ¯gure it
is assumed that contingent endowments are (wG;wB) = (wG;0). The pool returns
· per promise and thus consumption is transferred from the good state to the bad
through the price line · that joins (wG;0) and (0;wG·=(wG ¡ ·)). This \·-price"
is the representation of constraint (3) above.
Since consumers commit µwG of their endowment, their ¯nal consumption bundle
must lie on the 45± degree \µ-quantity" line starting at (wG(1 ¡ µ);0). This is the































Figure 2: Transferring consumption from the good
to the bad state of nature: ·-price line and µ-
quantity line.
the intersection of the two lines. It becomes clear now that promising more than
1 is possible as long as the net trade with the pool is positive, i.e., as long as the
µ-quantity line crosses the ·-price line for positive xG .




¼au(xG) + (1 ¡ ¼a)u(xB) ¡ ca ;
s:t: xG = wG ¡ µ(wG ¡ ·); (5a)
xB = wB ¡ µ(wB ¡ ·); (5b)
µ > 0; xG > 0; xB > 0; (5c)
a 2 A: (5d)
As a last comment on the consumers' problem, it can be pointed out that non-
negative constraints on consumption imply that µ 6 wG=(wG ¡ ·), from which it
can be concluded that µ > 1 is indeed admissible, since wG=(wG ¡ ·) > 1.
In what follows, let (x¤;µ¤
a;a¤) be a solution of the above maximization problem,
10and Ã(·;w) its solution set.
3 Equilibrium
In equilibrium, consumers maximize their utility by taking as given the return of the
pool, which is endogenously determined in a consistent way. Formally, we propose
the following:





(b) ·¤ is consistent,
(c) q¤ satis¯es:
(1) q¤ = 0 if (x¤;µ¤
a;a¤) 2 Ã(·¤;w) ) a¤ = L [Low Action Equilibrium],
(2) q¤ = 1 if (x¤;µ¤
a;a¤) 2 Ã(·¤;w) ) a¤ = H [High Action Equilibrium],
(3) q¤ 2 (0;1) otherwise [Mixed Action Equilibrium].
In the above de¯nition, it is stated that the equilibrium values of q must be properly
related to the optimal choices of consumers. In particular, q = 0 can only arise at
equilibrium if a = L is the optimal choice for every consumer. Similarly, q = 1 can
only arise if a = H is the optimal choice for every consumer. Finally, for q 2 (0;1) to
arise in equilibrium, both a = H and a = L must be optimal choices of consumers.
In what follows, we ¯rst consider uniform pool equilibria, in which all consumers
undertake the same action, and then mixed pool equilibria, in which some consumers
undertake the high e®ort action and others the low e®ort action.
3.1 Uniform pool equilibrium
In this section we ¯rst show that a high action equilibrium never arises (Proposi-
tion 1), and then we propose conditions for the existence of low action equilibrium
(Proposition 2).
11Proposition 1. [Impossibility of high action equilibrium]
There cannot be an equilibrium in which all consumers undertake the high action,
i.e., if (x¤;µ¤
a;a¤;q;·) is an equilibrium with pool of promises, then q 6= 1.
Proposition 1 states that q = 1 leads to a non consistent ·. From the de¯nition
of · in equation (2) it is easily seen that q = 1 would imply · = ¹ wH. Yet, when
consumers anticipate such a low price for insurance, their optimal choice is to buy
a lot of insurance (above the switching locus) and to choose a = L. However, from
the de¯nition of equilibrium it follows that if all consumers carry out the low e®ort
action, then q = 0, and therefore · = ¹ wH cannot be consistent.
In Proposition 2 we state the condition under which a low action equilibrium
exists. It is helpful to consider ¯rst the following problem:
max
x;µ
¼Hu(xG) + (1 ¡ ¼H)u(xB) ¡ cH ;
s:t: xG = wG ¡ µ(wG ¡ ¹ wL);
xB = wB ¡ µ(wB ¡ ¹ wL);
µ > 0; xG > 0; xB > 0:
The solution of the above problem is the optimal consumption bundle for a consumer
who can buy insurance at the price · = ¹ wL , conditional on choosing a = H . Let
(^ xH; ^ µH) represent this solution, and let (^ xL; ^ µL) = (( ¹ wL; ¹ wL);1) be the solution
of the consumers' problem when facing the same price · = ¹ wL but conditional on
choosing a = L. We can now state Proposition 2.
Proposition 2. [Possibility of low action equilibrium]
If U(^ xL;L) > U(^ xH;H), then a low action equilibrium exists.
In a low action equilibrium, q = 0 and therefore · = ¹ wL . Anticipating this price
of insurance, conditional on choosing a = L, consumers optimal bundle is the full
insurance one ^ xL , while conditional on choosing a = H, their optimal bundle is
^ xH . If (^ xL;L) is preferred to (^ xH;H), then indeed all consumers undertake the low
action, and hence q = 0 and · = ¹ wL is consistent.
The next section covers the mixed pool equilibrium, which arises when there is
no low action equilibrium.
123.2 Mixed pool equilibrium
In a mixed pool equilibrium, some consumers are willing to undertake the high action
and some others the low action. Yet, since consumers are ex ante equal, this can
only happen if they are all indi®erent between undertaking one action or the other.
In the following proposition we state the condition under which this happens.
Proposition 3. [Possibility of mixed action equilibrium]
If U(^ xL;L) < U(^ xH;H), then a mixed action equilibrium exists.
If the condition in Proposition 2 does not hold, then consumers prefer to under-
take the high action when faced with price · = ¹ wL . Moreover, from Proposition 1
it is known that consumers always undertake the low action when faced with price
· = ¹ wH . Since the consumers' problem solution is a closed and upper hemicon-
tinuous correspondence, there exists a price ^ · 2 ( ¹ wL; ¹ wH) at which consumers are
indi®erent between high and low action.8 It follows that at this price they split into
high and low action in the proportion q 2 (0;1) that ensures that ^ k is consistent.
Figure 3 illustrates an equilibrium with a mixed pool of promises for the case in
which wB = 0. The two bundles (xL;L), and (xH;H) yield the same utility, and
insurance is bough at the price ^ ·.
To help understand the mixed pool equilibrium we propose the following. Firstly,
in Section 4 we introduce two numerical examples. Secondly, in Section 5 we show
how in an economy of poor and rich consumers an aggregate pool of promises may
represent a Pareto improvement on segregated pools of promises. This result is
surprising since one would expect that the rich would enhance their welfare if they
pool only among themselves. However, as will become clear, the poor may play an
important role in ensuring a consistent return per promise.
4 Examples of Mixed Pool of Promises
We follow by presenting two speci¯c examples, so that the question at stake is
more clearly understood. In the ¯rst example it is assumed that u(x) = log(x),












Figure 3: Mixed Pool equilibrium.
As introduced in Section 2.2, given ·, consumers choose a consumption bundle,
a promise, and an action so as to maximize expected utility, under the budget
constraints described above. Using the ¯rst order condition for an interior maximum,












Conditional on the action chosen, optimal promises are decreasing both on contin-
gent endowment and the probability of the good state, since if the good state is very
likely one does not need to insure too much.
As it is clear from equation (7b), the optimal level of contingent consumptions
depends on the pool's return per promise. One can thus ¯nd the value ^ · above
(below) which consumers prefer to take the low (high) e®ort action. This is given
by the solution of the following equation:







The return per promise ^ · is increasing in the endowment of the good state of nature
and decreasing in the cost of the high e®ort action, meaning that the less costly the
action the greater ^ ·.
For ^ · to be consistent, it must hold that
^ · =
qµH(^ ·) ¹ wH + (1 ¡ q)µL(^ ·) ¹ wL
qµH(^ ·) + (1 ¡ q)µL(^ ·)
:
Substituting the optimal level of promises as given by equation (7a), and solving for
q, the proportion of consumers undertaking the high e®ort action that guarantees ^ ·











Figure 4 illustrates a mixed pooling equilibrium. There are three price-lines
represented: Those associated with the lower and higher probabilities of the good
state, and that associated with the pool return per promise (between the other two).
Associated with the ^ · that sustains the mixed pooling equilibrium are ^ q and two
levels of promises, µH(^ ·) and µL(^ ·). The promise of consumers undertaking the
high e®ort action is smaller than that of those undertaking the low e®ort action. In
particular µL(^ ·) > 1, and consumers overinsure. The ¯nal consumption bundles are
those at the intersection of each of the µa-quantity lines with the ^ ·-price line. At
these points, optimality requires indi®erence curves to be tangential to the ^ ·-price
line. Finally these two indi®erent curves are associated with the same level of utility
(they cross at the switching locus).
This mixed pool equilibrium could be an illustration of the following numerical
example: cH = 0:21, (¼H;¼L) = (2=3;1=3), and w = (1:5;0). In the mixed pool
equilibrium, ^ · = 0:52 and ^ q = 0:1. Equilibrium consumption and promises for
those consumers choosing high action and low action are, respectively, (xH;µH) =
((1;0:27);0:51) and (xL;µL) = ((0:5;0:53);1:02). The level of utility achieved is
U(xH;µH) = U(xL;µL) = ¡0:65.
15Alternatively, the following numerical example can be represented: u(x) = x°=
° with ° = 0:5, cH = 0:163, (¼H;¼L) = (2=3;1=3) and w = (1;0). An equi-
librium with a mixed pool of promises exists in this case, and it is such that
^ · = 0:4 and ^ q = 0:56. Equilibrium consumption and promises for those consumers
choosing the high action or the low action, are (xH;µH) = ((0:85;0:095);0:23),
and (xL;µL) = ((0:27;0:48);1:21), respectively. The level of utility achieved is
U(xH;H) = U(xL;L) = 1:27.
OO
xB
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Figure 4: Mixed Pool equilibrium.
5 Pool of Promises with Heterogeneous Consumers
The equilibrium concept just introduced may be extended to the case of heteroge-
neous groups of consumers. In particular it may be used to explore the possibility
of forming an aggregate pool, Pareto-superior to segregated ones, that would never
arise in the absence of moral hazard.
For the sake of speci¯city, we assume there are two large groups of consumers,
rich (R) and poor (P), di®ering in the distribution of their endowments, so that the
former have higher expected endowments than the latter. In the absence of moral
16hazard, it is easy to understand that consumers from the rich group would never
agree to join an aggregate pool with those from the poor group. To see this, let
¸R and ¸P denote, respectively, the proportion of rich and poor consumers, with
¸R +¸P = 1. Moreover, let ¹ wR and ¹ wP be the expected endowments of the former
and the latter, with ¹ wR > ¹ wP . In this case, the total expected endowments that an
aggregate pool can guarantee to its members is ¸R ¹ wR + ¸P ¹ wP . This is lower than
¹ wR , the expected endowment that a segregated pool of the rich alone can guarantee
to its members.
In the presence of moral hazard, an aggregate pool of poor and rich may emerge.
We assume that one group is still richer than the other in the sense that no matter
what action is chosen, rich consumers have higher expected endowments than poor
consumers. In this case the proportion of consumers choosing high action is en-
dogenously determined, and in particular a mixed pooling equilibrium may emerge.
Therefore, it may happen that a high enough proportion of them doing high e®ort
will o®set the reduction of the return of the pool due to the presence of the poor
consumers.
5.1 The pool of promises
When groups are segregated each pool of promises has a return per promise given








H + (1 ¡ qi)µi
L
; (9)
for i 2 fP;Rg. When an aggregated pool is formed, its return per promise depends













i ¸i(1 ¡ qi)µi
L
: (10)
Also in this case, the return of an aggregate pool is consistent if it satis¯es (10).
175.2 Equilibrium
When groups are segregated, the equilibrium concept is analogous to the one pre-
sented in De¯nition 3.1. Each pool's return per promise is given by (9), and for
consumers in group i choices are optimal given ·i.
When an aggregated pool is considered, the equilibrium de¯nition must be
amended to take into account that the pool's return per promise is determined
by (10) and that consumers' choices must be optimal given this. These properties
are summarized as follows:
De¯nition 5.1. An equilibrium with an aggregate pool of promises is (xi¤;µi¤
a ;ai¤;qi;·),
such that, for i 2 fP;Rg:
(a) (xi¤;µi¤
a ;ai¤) 2 Ãi(·;wi),
(b) · is consistent,
(c) qi satis¯es:
(1) qi = 0 if (xi¤;µi¤
a ;ai¤) 2 Ãi(·;wi) ) ai¤ = L, 8i,
(2) qi = 1 if (xi¤;µi¤
a ;ai¤) 2 Ãi(·;wi) ) ai¤ = H 8i,
(3) qi 2 (0;1) otherwise.
Moreover, let q :=
P
i ¸iqi be the aggregate proportion of consumers undertaking
high e®ort.
Consistently with the previous section, an equilibrium such that q 2 (0;1) is referred
to here as an equilibrium with a mixed (aggregate) pool of promises.
5.3 Mixed aggregate pool: an example
We provide an explicit example of a mixed aggregate pool. As in Example 1, we
assume that ui(x) = log(x), wi
G > wi
B = 0, ¼R
H = ¼P





G , with 0 < ® < 1.
It is straightforward to apply the former formulation to the heterogenous case.






































Consistently with our previous statement, the promises of the poor are greater
than those of the rich. It also follows from equation (8) that ^ · is increasing in endow-
ment, so that the return per promise that makes consumers indi®erent as to which
action to undertake is higher for the rich. We let ^ ·i represent this critical return
per promise of group i 2 fP;Rg. Therefore, considering a candidate equilibrium ·,
one of the following con¯guration may happen:
1. ^ ·P < ^ ·R < ·, and both poor and rich choose to take the low e®ort action.
Hence, q = 0.
2. ^ ·P < ^ ·R = ·, and the poor choose to take the low action while the rich are
indi®erent. Hence, qP = 0, qR 2 (0;1), and q 2 (0;1).
3. ^ ·P < · < ^ ·R , and the poor choose to take the low action while the rich take
the high action. Hence, qP = 0, qR = 1, and q 2 (0;1).
4. ^ ·P = · < ^ ·R , and the poor are indi®erent while the rich take the high action.
Hence, qP 2 (0;1), qR = 1, and q 2 (0;1).
5. · < ^ ·P < ^ ·R , and both poor and rich take the high action. Hence, q = 1.
Three things are worthy of note here. First, since ^ ·P < ^ ·R , poor consumers will
never undertake a more costly action than rich ones. Second, incorporating the
additional assumption that the poor consumers bear a higher cost when undertaking
the high action merely increases the disparity between between ^ ·P and ^ ·R. This is
19because ^ · is decreasing in the cost of e®ort as can easily be seen from equation (8).
Third, some of the above might never arise in equilibrium because · might be non
consistent. In particular, we already know from Proposition 1 that case 5 can never
arise in equilibrium.
We now provide a numerical illustration of case 2. We assume equal sized groups
and that (¼H;¼L) = (2=3;1=3). Poor consumers are just like those in the ¯rst
example of homogenous consumers in the end of Section 4. When pooling promises
only among themselves they generate an equilibrium such as the one described in
that example. The ¯rst column of Table 2 synthesizes the information concerning
the segregated mixed pool of the poor.
Rich consumers, by contrast, have a higher contingent endowment in the good
state of nature wR = (2;0), and it is less costly for them to take the high action
cR
H = 0:2. This assumption is natural when interpreted in terms of the access that
wealthier people have to accident-preventing practices. The second column of Table
2 presents information concerning the segregated pool of the rich. When 10% of them
take the high action, they can generate a mixed pool with a return per promise of
0.7. In this case, they achieve a utility level of ¡0:35, clearly superior to what the
poor can get by themselves.
Now let the two groups enter a common pool, characterized in the third column
of Table 2. Recall that in this example the return per promise of the aggregate
pool equals the return per promise of the mixed segregated pool of the rich alone.
Therefore, facing the same return per promise, the rich have no reason to commit
di®erently and end up with the same level of utility. The poor are however much
better o®. They face a higher return per promise, which makes them want to promise
more. As anticipated, none of them undertakes the high action.
The message of this example is that by mixing poor and rich in a pool of promises
there is room for a Pareto improvement: the poor are better o® and the rich are
equally well o®. This follows since the proportion of the rich undertaking the high
action increases, which is possible because they are still indi®erent with respect to
which action to choose.
The economy therefore gains from two di®erent e®ects. Firstly, the rich are more
20Pool of Poor Pool of Rich Heterogenous Pool
cH 0.21 0.20
q 0.1 0.1 qP = 0 qR = 0:8
· 0.52 0.7 0.7
µ¤




H (1;0:27) (4=3;0:36) xP
¤




L 1.02 1.02 µP
¤




L (0:5;0:53) (2=3;0:72) xP
¤
L = (0:5;0:875) xR
¤
L = (2=3;0:72)
UCH ¡0:65 ¡0:35 UR
CH = ¡0:35
UCL ¡0:65 ¡0:35 UP
CL = ¡0:32 UR
CL = ¡0:35
Table 2: Example of a mixed heterogenous pool of promises
active in preventing the bad state of nature. This process increases the aggregate
expected endowment since a rich consumer in the good state of nature is endowed
with more than a poor one. Secondly, the rich bear a lower cost in preventing the bad
state of nature and this reduces the economy's overall cost of preventing accidents.
In other words, the rich can, at no cost, redistribute towards the poor because they
are wealthier and are more able to prevent bad outcomes.
6 Conclusion
We analyze the pool of promises in a setting with ex-ante moral hazard, in which
agents a®ect the probability distribution of events. This additional freedom allows
for the possibility of some consumers making high e®orts and others low e®orts in
equilibrium, even though consumers are ex-ante alike. Consequently, besides the
low e®ort equilibrium, it is also possible that economies end up in a mixed pool
equilibrium with q consumers undertaking the high action. When a heterogeneous
population is considered, we show how the rich, who are also more able, can redis-
tribute towards the poor at no cost, i.e., the heterogenous pool Pareto dominates
the two segregated pools.
A natural question to raise here is whether a mixed equilibrium can be imple-
21mented. The pool organizer can be thought of as allocating consumers to promise
levels according to the q that guarantees a consistent return per promise. Again it
should be stressed that consumers are completely indi®erent to this process, since
they obtain the same level of utility whatever the action.
In our view this framework is of particular interest in developing countries. As
Pauly et al. (2006) suggests, it seems reasonable to think of insurance cooperatives
as an adequate form of insurance organization for these countries. In fact, on the one
hand, tax systems are often more de¯cient, which compromises compulsory public
insurance schemes. On the other hand, the populations of these countries are poorer
and more often excluded from the market. In developing countries, mutual insurance
solutions have indeed emerged for smaller communities. For example, Cabrales et al.
(2003) analyze a speci¯c mutual ¯re insurance scheme used in Andorra, De Weerdt
and Dercon (2006) ¯nd evidence of risk-sharing across networks within a village in
Tanzania, and Murgai et al. (2002) study water transfers on two water courses in
Pakistan. We additionally argue that a voluntary mutual insurance scheme, such as
the pool of promises, could be implemented at national level.
For application to developing economies, it seems reasonable to extend this model
so that it encompasses aggregate uncertainty. Another interesting extension is to
consider the possibility of limiting promises. This has the same e®ect as partial in-
surance has in standard models with moral hazard: it makes a high action enhancing
consumers' welfare incentive compatible. In a heterogenous pool, the consequences
of limiting promises are however not as straightforward. This is precisely the next
point on our research agenda.
7 Appendix
In this Appendix, we prove all the propositions in the text. To that end, we ¯nd it useful to modify
the consumers' problem as follows. We eliminate µ by substituting (5a)¡(5b) for the ·-price line
given by (3). Note that (3) can then be written as
· ¡ wB
wG ¡ ·
(xG ¡ wG) + (xB ¡ wB) = 0 , (· ¡ wB)(xG ¡ wG) + (wG ¡ ·)(xB ¡ wB) = 0:





the consumers' problem can be rewritten as the following generalized consumers' problem:
max
x;a
¼au(xG) + (1 ¡ ¼a)u(xB) ¡ ca ;
s:t: ¼(xG ¡ wG) + (1 ¡ ¼)(xB ¡ wB) = 0; (13a)
0 6 xG 6 wG ; (13b)
a 2 A: (13c)
With consistent notation, let '(¼;w) denote its solution set. Since in the above problem the choice
set is a compact-valued and continuous correspondence and the objective function is continuous, it
follows from the Maximum Theorem that '(¼;w) is a closed and upper hemicontinuous correspon-
dence.
We now introduce Lemma 7.1 and Lemma 7.2, which will be useful in characterizing the equilibria
of the pool of promises. Lemma 7.1 relates the solutions of the generalized consumers' problem to
those of the problem introduced on page 11.
Lemma 7.1. If (x;a) satis¯es (13a)¡(13c) for some ¼ , then (x;µ;a) satis¯es (5a)¡(5d) for µ =
(wG¡xG)=(wG¡·) and · given by (12). Moreover, if (x;µ;a) satis¯es (5a)¡(5d) for some ·, then
(x;a) satis¯es (13a)¡(13c) for ¼ given by (12).
Lemma 7.2 is due to Hellwig (1983a) and characterizes the consumer's optimal solution.
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Lemma 7.2. [Hellwig (1983a), Lemma A.1]. If (x;a) 2 '(¼;w) and ¼a 6 ¼ , then xG 6 xB
and a = L.
Proof of Lemma 7.2. Consider the following function:








with a 2 A, xG 2 [0;wG] and ¼ 2 [¼L;¼H]. A solution of the generalized consumers' problem
corresponds to a maximum of v(¢;¢;¼). Since v is concave in xG , and since ¼a 6 ¼ implies
@v(a;wG;¼)=@xG < 0; the maximum is reached at some xG such that xG = 0 or xG > 0: In the
¯rst case, we have that xB = wB +(¼wG=(1¡¼)) > 0 = xG ; while in the second case @v(a;xG;¼)=
@xG = 0 implies xB = wB + (¼(wG ¡ xG)=(1 ¡ ¼)) > xG ; since u
0(¢) is decreasing.
Proof of Proposition 1. [Impossibility of high action equilibrium]
If q = 1, then · = ¹ wH and, by (12), ¼ = ¼H . From the analysis of the generalized consumer's
problem it follows that in this case (x;a) 2 '(¼H;w) implies a = L, and, by Lemma 7.1, so does
(x;µa;a) 2 Ã( ¹ wH;w). By de¯nition of equilibrium, q = 0 and this is the required contradiction.
23Proof of proposition 2. [Possibility of low action equilibrium]
If U(^ xL;L) > U(^ xH;H), then (x;a) 2 '(¼L;w) implies a = L, and, by Lemma 7.1, so does
(x;µa;a) 2 Ã( ¹ wL;w). By de¯nition of equilibrium, q = 0, hence · is consistent.
In order to prove Proposition 3, we need the following lemma, due to Hellwig (1983b). Since the
original source may be di±cult to access, we o®er a complete proof, following closely the original
one, to facilitate the task of readers.
Lemma 7.3. [Hellwig (1983b), Lemma 3.2].
For any given (¼H;¼L;w) such that 1 > ¼H > ¼L > 0 and wG > wB > 0 there exists a c > 0 such
that, for c > cH > 0, (x;a) 2 '(¼L;w) implies xG > xB and a = H. In this case, there exists a
price of insurance ^ ¼, an overinsurance consumption bundle xL and a partial insurance consumption
bundle xH such that f(xH;H);(xL;L)g = '(^ ¼;w).
Proof of lemma 7.3.
We ¯rst prove the ¯rst part of the proposition, then the second part. Let
»(x) := ¼Hu(xG) + (1 ¡ ¼H)u(xB); (14a)
Â(¼L;w) := argmaxf»(x)j¼L(xG ¡ wG) + (1 ¡ ¼L)(xB ¡ wB) = 0; 0 6 xG 6 0g: (14b)
From the ¯rst order conditions of the problem in (14b), we can easily verify that x 2 Â(¼L;w)
implies xG > xB, hence x 6= ^ xL , where we recall that ^ xL = ( ¹ wL; ¹ wL).
10 Since ^ xL satis¯es the
constraint set in (14b), x 2 Â(¼L;w) also implies »(x) > »(^ xL), where the strict inequality follows
from the strict concavity of ». For x 2 Â(¼L;w), we let »
¤ = »(x) ¡ »(^ xL). From the above
analysis it follows that »
¤ it is strictly positive, and from the Maximum Theorem it follows that




(w;¼H;¼L) 2 D implies w1 > w2 > 0 and 1 > ¼H > ¼L > 0. Let c > 0 be this minimum. If follows
that there exists 0 < cH < c such that cH < »
¤, hence that »(^ xL) < »(x) ¡ cH with x 2 Â(¼L;w).
This concludes the proof of the ¯rst part of the lemma.
As for the second part, let ¦ be the set of insurance prices at which which consumers choose
full, or overinsurance, and low e®ort, which is formally de¯ned as follows:
¦ := f¼ j(x;L) 2 '(¼;w); xB > xGg :
Notice that ¼H 2 ¦, hence ¦ 6= ?. Moreover, we assume that ¼L = 2 ¦. The ¯rst part of lemma
7.3, which has just been proved, guarantees that this is indeed legitimate. Finally, let
^ ¼ := inff¼ j¼ 2 ¦g; (15)
One should notice that ^ ¼ > ¼L . Indeed, if ^ ¼ = ¼L , there exists a sequence ¼
n 2 ¦ such that
¼








24for some x. Since ' is a closed correspondence, it follows that (x;L) 2 '(¼L;w) with xB > xG :













By construction, ^ ¼ > ¼h > ¼L. Therefore, by de¯nition of ^ ¼ , (x;a) 2 '(¼h;w) cannot imply a = L
and xB > xG . Moreover, it cannot imply a = L and xB < xG because of lemma 7.2. Hence, one can
conclude that (x;a) 2 '(¼h;w) implies a = H and xG > xB. Moreover, if (xh;H) 2 '(¼h;w), then
xh belongs to the constraint set in the generalized consumer problem, which is compact. Therefore
the series xh converges to some xH as h tends to in¯nity. Summing up, we have that ¼h ! ^ ¼ and
xh ! xH as h ! 1, and (xh;H) 2 '(¼h;w) for every h. Since ' is upper hemicontinuous, it













From the de¯nition of ^ ¼ , there exists a sequence ¼l 2 ¦ such that ¼l ! ¼ : It follows that there






G : As a consequence, there exists a subsequence
converging to some (xL;L). Since ' is closed, it follows that (xL;L) 2 '(^ ¼;w): This concludes the
proof.
Proof of proposition 3 [Possibility of mixed action equilibrium].
If U(^ xL;L) < U(^ xH;H), then (x;a) 2 '(¼L;w) implies a = H and xG > xB . In this case, by
lemma 7.3 there exists a price of insurance ^ ¼, an overinsurance consumption bundle xL and a
partial insurance consumption bundle xH such that f(xH;H);(xL;L)g = '(^ ¼;w). Therefore, from
Lemma 7.1 we know that for ^ · given by (12) with ¼ = ^ ¼ , there exist µL > 1 > µH > 0 such that
f(xH;µH;H);(xL;µL;L)g = Ã(^ ·;w). By de¯nition of equilibrium, it must be that q 2 (0;1), and




µH (^ · ¡ ¹ wH)
µL ( ¹ wL ¡ ^ ·)
¸¡1
:




2DPTEA - Luiss Guido Carli.
3We have particularly in mind heterogeneous consumers participating voluntarily in big pools
of health, disability or unemployment insurance, in the presence of moral hazard. While in reality
most social insurance schemes are compulsory, there are nevertheless some examples of voluntary
social insurance. For instance, in 1981 Chile turned its compulsory social health insurance system
25into a voluntary one. Also, recently, the residents of the state of New York have been o®ered several
state health insurance programs. These target currently non-insured individuals who are above the
traditional Medicaid income limits or employers not providing health insurance. Individuals may
voluntarily qualify for the \Family Health Plus" program or the \Healthy NY", for example. Even
in more welfare states with a more European tradition, the growing number of self-employed persons
increases the number of individuals relying on voluntary social insurance. Goul~ ao (2005) studies
the implications of a voluntary social insurance scheme with adverse selection.
4As has been well known since Arrow (1963), moral hazard in health, disability and unemploy-
ment insurance is highly signi¯cant.
5This shows up a major conceptual di®erence with the setup of Dubey and Geanakoplos (2002),
since in their adverse selection model the proportion of high-risk consumers and low-risk consumers
is an exogenous parameter.
6Since consumers are ex-ante equal, this result requires them to be indi®erent to undertaking
either of the actions.
7Figure 1 only represents the relevant part of each indi®erence curve, i.e. the high e®ort indif-
ferent curve below the switching locus, and the low e®ort indi®erent curve above it.
8See the Appendix for details.
9We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting a useful simpli¯cation of the proof of this result.
10This also follows from the observation that in the above problem the price of insurance is less
than fair.
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